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Abstract—In this work we analyze a measurement-device-
independent (MDI) protocol to establish continuous-variable
(CV) quantum key distribution (QKD) between two ground
stations. We assume communication occurs between the ground
stations via satellite over two independent atmospheric-fading
channels dominated by turbulence-induced beam wander. In this
MDI protocol the measurement device is the satellite itself, and
the security of the protocol is analyzed through an equivalent
entanglement-based swapping scheme. We quantify the positive
impact the fading channels can have on the final quantum key
rates, demonstrating how the protocol is able to generate a
positive key rate even over high-loss atmospheric channels. This
is somewhat counter-intuitive given that the same outcome is
only possible in the low-loss regime for a measurement device
centrally positioned in a fiber-optic channel. Our results show
that useful space-based quantum key generation rates between
two ground stations are possible even when the relay satellite is
held by an adversary. The cost in key rate incurred by altering
the status of the satellite from trustworthy to untrustworthy is
presented.
I. INTRODUCTION
QKD allows two distant parties, Alice and Bob, to generate
a secret key (unknown to a potential eavesdropper, Eve) over
insecure quantum and classical channels. In discrete-variable
(DV) QKD systems the key information is encoded on the
properties of single photons, and detection is realized by
single-photon detectors e.g., [1]–[3]. In CV-QKD the key in-
formation is encoded on the quadrature variables of the optical
field, and detection is realized by high-efficiency homodyne
(or heterodyne) detection techniques e.g., [4]–[8].
QKD schemes are mostly implemented based on point-to-
point protocols where Alice encodes the key information onto
quantum states which are then transmitted over an unsecured
quantum channel. At the output of the channel Bob receives
and measures the incoming states to infer the information of
the sender. The secure key rate of point-to-point QKD is highly
dependent on the devices utilized at the sender and receiver
stations, particularly the measurement devices. Unfortunately,
practical detectors are not perfect and their inherent flaws can
become the attack focus of an adversary [9], [10]. To alleviate
this concern MDI protocols have been proposed [11], [12].
In MDI protocols both trusted (legitimate) parties transmit
quantum states to a third party (assumed untrustworthy) who
realizes the measurements. The measurement outcomes will
then be used by the legitimate users to establish secure keys
independent of the measurement device. Such procedures are
particularly useful in relay systems, where due to channel
issues an intermediate relay must be used to complete the
communication link. MDI protocols have been well analyzed
in theory [11]–[17], and experimentally demonstrated with DV
systems [18]–[21] and CV systems [17].
Previous works on MDI protocols have largely focussed on
fixed-attenuation channels such as optical fiber [18]–[21]. In
the deployment of QKD between two remote ground stations
a viable option could be the use of an MDI protocol with
a low-Earth orbit (LEO) satellite realizing the measurement.
However, the turbulent atmosphere between ground and satel-
lite leads to a fading channel, whose nature of course is
radically different from the fixed-attenuation channel. Also,
the atmospheric fading channel typically incurs very high loss
rates. This is somewhat of a concern for the implementation
of a MDI protocol since previous works on fixed-attenuation
channels clearly demonstrate the non-viability of such a pro-
tocol in the high-loss regime. Thus, in terms of the quantum
key rates, it remains unclear if the atmospheric-fading channels
can lead to an effective implementation of a MDI protocol.
It is the main purpose of this work to provide a quantitative
assessment, in terms of the resulting key rates, of a CV-MDI
protocol over atmospheric-fading channels. Among the many
contributors to the transmission fluctuation in Earth-to-satellite
communications, we will focus here only on the fluctuations
caused by beam wandering - the largest contributor [22]–[24].
We will analyze the security of our MDI protocol through
the use of an equivalent entanglement-based swapping scheme
e.g., [25], [26]. In doing this we will utilize some of our
own previous work on the Gaussian entanglement produced by
entanglement swapping over atmospheric channels [27]–[29].
Our key aim is to compare the performance (in terms of the
resultant key rates) of our CV-MDI protocol implemented over
atmospheric-fading channels to the corresponding CV-MDI
protocol over fixed-attenuation channels. We will also explore
the cost, in the context of quantum key rates, of moving from
the usual mode of assuming a trustworthy satellite to the MDI
mode of assuming an untrustworthy satellite.
This paper is organized as follows: In Section II, our
CV-MDI protocol is described in detail. In Section III, the
simulation results on the performance of the protocol over the
atmospheric-fading channels are presented and discussed. Our
conclusions are provided in Section IV.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND QUANTUM KEY RATE
We now describe the implementation of a CV-MDI protocol
and outline how to determine the quantum key rates of this
protocol for the atmospheric channel.
A. A CV-MDI Protocol
Let us first introduce some notation on CV states we will
need for our discussions of the MDI protocol. For a single
bosonic mode with annihilation and creation operators aˆ, aˆ†,
the quadrature operators qˆ, pˆ are defined by qˆ = aˆ+ aˆ† , pˆ =
i(aˆ† − aˆ ) which satisfy the commutation relation [qˆ, pˆ] = 2i
(here ~ = 2). The vector of quadrature operators for a
quantum state with n modes can be defined as Rˆ1,...,n =
(qˆ1, pˆ1, . . . , qˆn, pˆn ). Similarly, R1,...,n = (q1, p1, . . . , qn, pn )
is defined for the corresponding quadrature variables. Gaussian
states are completely characterized by the first moment of the
quadrature operators
〈
Rˆ1,...,n
〉
and a covariance matrix (CM)
M , i.e. a matrix of the second moments of the quadrature
operators, which can be written as
Mij =
1
2
〈
RˆiRˆj + RˆjRˆi
〉
−
〈
Rˆi
〉〈
Rˆj
〉
. (1)
By local unitary operators, the first moment of every two-
mode Gaussian state can be set to zero and the CM can be
transformed into the following standard form
M =
(
A C
CT B
)
, (2)
where A = aI , B = bI , C = diag (c+, c−), a, b, c+, c− ∈
R, and I is a 2× 2 identity matrix.
In a typical point-to-point QKD protocol two distant trusted
parties, Alice and Bob, first create two sets of correlated data
by exchanging quantum states over an unsecured quantum
channel. In a prepare-and-measure (PM) scheme Alice is the
sender who prepares the quantum states and Bob is the re-
ceiver who measures the incoming quantum states. Following
the steps of reconciliation and privacy amplification over a
public (but authenticated) classical channel, Alice and Bob
can subsequently generate a secret key even in the presence
of Eve.
In this work we will largely focus on the CV-MDI protocol
[13]–[17] whose sources are Gaussian states, experimentally
demonstrated over free-space (non-fading) channels [17].
1) CV-MDI protocol in the PM Scheme: The CV-
MDI protocol in the PM scheme proceeds as follows:
Preparation: If squeezed states represent the initial quantum
resource, Alice (Bob) prepares mode A (qˆA, pˆA) (mode B
(qˆB, pˆB)) in a squeezed state with CM Ms = diag(1/v, v),
where v = exp(2rs), and where rs is the single-mode
squeezing. The squeezed quadrature of mode A (mode B)
is then modulated by a random Gaussian-distributed variable
with zero mean and variance vm such that vm = v − 1/v.
We will assume modes A and B are modulated by the same
but independent Gaussian distributions. Choosing to squeeze
either the qˆ or pˆ quadrature is based on a random bit generated
at Alice and Bob’s side.
If coherent states represent the initial quantum resource,
Alice (Bob) prepares mode A (qˆA, pˆA) (mode B (qˆB, pˆB))
in a coherent state, where each quadrature of mode A and
mode B are independently modulated by a random Gaussian-
distributed variable with zero mean and variance v′m.
Transmission: Alice and Bob transmit modes A and B
over the insecure lossy channels to the untrusted relay.
Measurement: A CV Bell measurement is performed on the
incoming modes A′′ and B′′ (where the ′′ indicates that the
states have now incurred losses), which means modes A′′ and
B′′ are combined on a balanced beam splitter whose output
ports are conjugately homodyned. As a result, the quadrature
operators qˆ− = 1√2 (qˆA′′ − qˆB′′) and pˆ+ =
1√
2
(pˆA′′ + pˆB′′)
are measured by the two homodyne detectors, and the classical
measurement outcomes (q−, p+) with probability p (q−, p+)
are then communicated over a public channel to Alice and Bob.
Then Bob modifies his data based on the Bell measurement
outcomes, while Alice keeps her data unchanged. As a result,
the mutual information between Alice and Bob becomes
nonzero, and a correlation is created between the two parties.
As the relay may be controlled by Eve, she does know the
measurement results, however, this knowledge would not help
her extract precise information on Alice and Bob’s encodings.
Post-processing: After the establishment of a sufficiently large
amount of correlated data, Alice and Bob proceed with the
classical post-processing over an authenticated public channel
which starts by applying sifting process (no sifting is needed
when the two partners prepare the coherent states) and contin-
ues with parameter estimation, information reconciliation and
privacy amplification to distill a secret key. The reconciliation
can be performed in two ways; either Alice’s data or Bob’s
data are the reference. Any false reporting of the Bell mea-
surement results by the relay will be readily detected in the
post-processing phase.
Although the CV-MDI protocol is practically implemented
in a PM scheme, we will study the protocol in an equiv-
alent entanglement-based (EB) scheme that invokes CV-
entanglement swapping at the satellite.
2) CV-MDI protocol in the EB Scheme: In the EB scheme,
a pair of two-mode squeezed vacuum (TMSV) states ρ12
and ρ34 with the same two-mode squeezing rt ∈ [0, ∞)
are initially owned by Alice and Bob respectively, where
indices 1 − 4 indicate the modes. Let us consider the initial
two-mode Gaussian entangled states ρ12 and ρ34 having zero
mean and CM of the following form
Mi =
(
v I
√
v2 − 1Z√
v2 − 1Z v I
)
, (3)
where Z = diag (1,−1), and v = cosh (2rt) is the quadrature
variance of each mode. Modes 1 and 4 are held by Alice
and Bob, while modes 2 and 3 are transmitted towards
the intermediate relay over the insecure lossy channels with
transmissivities of τA and τB , respectively. Assuming the fixed
values of τA and τB , the received states at the relay, ρ12′′ and
ρ3′′4, are still Gaussian, and described with CMs
M12′′ =
(
v I
√
τA
√
v2 − 1Z√
τA
√
v2 − 1Z (τAv + (1− τA) + εA) I
)
M3′′4 =
(
(τBv + (1− τB) + εB) I √τB
√
v2 − 1Z√
τB
√
v2 − 1Z v I
)
,
(4)
where εA and εB are the excess noise contributions assumed
to be independent of the channel loss. In implementations
of CV-MDI QKD, excess noise generally comes from the
two sources; quantum state preparation at the transmitters
(laser’s phase noise and imperfections in the modulation),
and Bell measurement at the receiver (electronic noise and
imperfections in the homodyne detectors). We will assume the
transmitter noise is negligible relative to the receiver noise.
The received modes 2′′ and 3′′ are swapped via a Bell
measurement at the intermediate relay, where the modes 2′′
and 3′′ are combined in a balanced beam-splitter, yielding
output modes s and t. Then, the new quadratures qˆs =
1√
2
(qˆ2′′ − qˆ3′′) and pˆt = 1√2 (pˆ2′′ + pˆ3′′) are measured by two
homodyne detectors, providing the classical outcomes (qs, pt)
with probability p (qs, pt). The swapping process continues
with the relay communicating the Bell measurement results
through a classical public channel to Alice and Bob. After the
swapping process the CM of the conditional Gaussian state
ρ14 shared between Alice and Bob can be obtained [27], [30]
M14 =
(
vI 0
0 vI
)
−
(
v2 − 1)
(
τA
θ I −
√
τAτB
θ Z
−
√
τAτB
θ Z
τB
θ I
)
,
(5)
where θ = (v− 1)(τA+ τB)+ (εA+ εB)+ 2. After receiving
the Bell measurement outcomes, Bob displaces mode 4 and
obtains mode 4′, while Alice keeps mode 1 unchanged. Then
Alice and Bob measure modes 1 and 4′ by homodyne (or
heterodyne) detectors to create correlated data. After the
establishment of a sufficiently large amount of correlated data,
Alice and Bob proceed with the classical postprocessing over
an authenticated public channel to create a secret key.
3) Equivalence of CV-MDI protocol in the EB Scheme and
the PM Scheme: (See Appendix for more details.) In the
EB scheme of the CV-MDI protocol, if Alice (Bob) applies
a homodyne detection on mode 1 (mode 4) of the initial
TMSV state ρ12 (ρ34), the prepared state in its equivalent
PM scheme is a squeezed state on mode 2 (mode 3), whose
squeezed quadrature is modulated by a random Gaussian
distributed variable of zero mean and variance vm = v− 1/v.
If Alice (Bob) applies a heterodyne detection on mode 1
(mode 4), the prepared state in its equivalent PM scheme is a
coherent state on mode 2 (mode 3), whose both quadratures are
independently modulated by a random Gaussian-distributed
variable of zero mean and variance v′m = v − 1.
Note that these homodyne and heterodyne detections by
Alice and Bob in the EB scheme can be postponed to after the
Bell measurement at the relay since the local measurements
commute. In the protocol of coherent states, the displacement
variance v′m is the result of a feasible modulation, hence v′m
can reach high values, for instance v′m = 60 [17]. On the
contrary, in the protocol of squeezed states, high values of
squeezing are experimentally challenging to achieve, hence
the value of v and also vm is practically limited. For example,
v = 5.05 is equivalent to the two-mode squeezing of 10dB
(the state-of-the-art vacuum squeezing for the TMSV state).
B. Quantum Key Rate
Having the conditional Gaussian state with the CM in the
form of Eq. (5), we are able to analytically compute the key
rate K of the protocol in bits per pulse, under the assumption
of Gaussian attacks by Eve [31]. We will make the usual
assumption that the number of exchanges between the trusted
parties and the relay are considered infinite. We will also
assume Alice and Bob before their detections share a Gaussian
state ρAB having zero mean value and CM in the following
form
MAB =
(
a I cZ
cZ b I
)
. (6)
Note that the CM of the conditional Gaussian state of the
MDI protocol, i.e., M14 is also in the above form. Assuming
a perfect reconciliation algorithm, the key rate is given by
K = IAB−IE1, where IAB is the mutual information between
Alice and Bob [6]–[8]. In the reconciliation step, If Alice’s
data are the reference, IE = IAE is Eve’s mutual information
with Alice, while if Bob’s data are the reference, IE = IBE is
Eve’s mutual information with Bob. Note that IAB is the same
regardless of whose data are the reference of reconciliation.
Recalling that we are considering two protocols of the EB
scheme in which the trusted parties apply the same type of
detection (homodyne detection or heterodyne detection to their
own modes), we can now proceed to determine key rates for
each case.
(i) Homodyne detection by the trusted parties: Al-
ice and Bob’s mutual information is given by IAB =
1
2 log2
(
a
a−(c2/b)
)
. If Alice is the reference in the recon-
ciliation step, Eve’s mutual information with Alice can be
calculated as IAE = S(ρE) − S(ρE|A ), where S(ρE) is
the von Neumann entropy of Eve’s state before Alice and
Bob’s detections, and S(ρE|A ) is the von Neumann entropy
of Eve’s state conditioned on Alice’s detection. Note that
because Eve provides a purification of Alice and Bob’s density
matrix, we can write S(ρE) = S(ρAB), and S(ρAB) can be
calculated through the symplectic eigenvalues ν± of MAB as
S(ρAB) = f(ν+) + f(ν−), where f(x) = x+12 log2
(
x+1
2
) −
x−1
2 log2
(
x−1
2
)
, and ν2± =
(
∆±
√
∆2 − 4 det (MAB)
)
/2,
with ∆ = a2 + b2 − 2c2. Next, S(ρE|A ) = f(ν) where
ν2 = b
(
b− (c2/a)).
1In a realistic reconciliation algorithm, Alice and Bob obtain only a fraction
of the mutual information IAB , and thus the key rate is given by K =
ξIAB − IE where ξ is the reconciliation efficiency.
If Bob is the reference in the reconciliation step, we are
required to calculate Eve’s mutual information with Bob which
is given as IBE = S(ρE) − S(ρE|B ), where S(ρE) is
calculated in the same way as before, while S(ρE|B ) = f(ν)
where ν2 = a
(
a− (c2/b)).
(ii) Heterodyne detection by the trusted parties: Al-
ice and Bob’s mutual information is given by IAB =
log2
(
b+1
b+1−(c2/(a+1))
)
. If Alice is the reference in the rec-
onciliation step, Eve’s mutual information with Alice IAE
is calculated in the same way as the homodyne detection
protocol (where Alice is the reference) except here ν =
b− (c2/(a+ 1)).
If Bob is the reference in the reconciliation step, Eve’s
mutual information with Bob IBE is calculated in the same
way as the homodyne detection protocol (where Bob is the
reference) except here ν = a− (c2/(b+ 1)).
C. CV-MDI Protocol over Atmospheric-Fading Channels
In this work we study a satellite-based communication
scheme to implement the CV-MDI protocol between two re-
mote ground stations. Let us assume Alice and Bob are located
in the ground stations, and there exists a direct communication
link from each ground station to the satellite, with the satellite
acting as an intermediate relay (untrusted relay) that applies
the Bell measurement to the incoming quantum states.
In atmospheric channels fluctuations in the transmissivity
ηtran can be the result of several effects. Such fading channels
can be characterized by a distribution of values η with a
probability density distribution p (η), where η = √ηtran.
As in other recent studies [22]–[24], we will assume that
atmospheric fading is solely due to beam wander. Assuming
the beam spatially fluctuates around the centroid of the re-
ceiver’s aperture, the probability density distribution p (η) can
be described by the log-negative Weibull distribution [23],
p (η) =
2L2
σ2bγsη
(
2 ln
η0
η
)( 2γs−1)
exp
(
− L
2
2σ2b
(
2 ln
η0
η
)( 2γs ))
(7)
for η ∈ [0, η0], with p (η) = 0 otherwise. Here, σ2b is the
beam wander variance, γs is the shape parameter, L is the
scale parameter, and η0 is the maximum value of η. The latter
three parameters are given by
γs = 8h
exp(−4h)I1[4h]
1−exp(−4h)I0[4h]
[
ln
(
2η2
0
1−exp(−4h)I0[4h]
)]−1
L = β
[
ln
(
2η2
0
1−exp(−4h)I0[4h]
)]−(1/γs)
η20 = 1− exp (−2h) ,
(8)
where I0 [.] and I1 [.] are the modified Bessel functions, and
where h = (β/W )2, with β being the receiver aperture radius
and W the beam-spot radius. In our calculations we will adopt
W = β, and let adjustments to the value of σb set the mean
fading loss. We can ignore the effects of dephasing in the
atmospheric channel [32]. We will assume a local oscillator
passing through the channel (in an orthogonal polarized mode
to the signal) allows us to measure the channel transmission
factor in real time.
In the CV-MDI protocol over the atmospheric channels, one
mode of each initial entangled state is kept by the ground
station and the second mode of each state is transmitted to the
satellite through a fading uplink, where the fading uplink from
Alice (Bob) to satellite is characterized by transmission coef-
ficient ηA (ηB) and probability density distribution pA (ηA)
(pB (ηB)). We will assume that the two fading channels are
independent and not necessarily identical. Let the difference
between the two fading channels be controlled only by the
difference in the value of σb, such that σb A = kσb B , k > 0,
where σb A (σb B) is the beam wander standard deviation of
Alice’s fading uplink (Bob’s fading uplink). Note that k allows
us to parameterize the difference between the two fading
uplinks in terms of the geometry, such as the distance from
each ground station to the satellite. After applying the Bell
measurement at the satellite and broadcasting the measurement
results to the ground stations, the conditional state ρ14 after
each realization of ηA and ηB is still Gaussian, and can
be completely described by the CM in Eq. (5), where the
transmissivities τA and τB need to be replaced by η2A and η2B .
Thus, after each realization of ηA and ηB the key rate can
be calculated through the use of the CM of the conditional
Gaussian state as K(ηA, ηB). Then, the final key rate can be
given by averaging over all the possibilities of the two fading
channels as K =
∫ η0
0
∫ η0
0 K(ηA, ηB)p(ηA)p(ηB) dηA dηB .
III. SIMULATION RESULTS
We now simulate the performance (in terms of the quantum
key rates) of the CV-MDI protocol over the fading channels.
In Fig. 1(a), we first plot the key rate K (in bits per
pulse) for the symmetric setting of the MDI protocol, i.e.,
σb A = σb B = σb as a function of channel loss for the
two types of detection, homodyne detection and heterodyne
detection. This figure shows the key rate when the quadrature
variance of the TMSV states is v = 60 (the same for
homodyne and heterodyne detections), the excess noise terms
are the same as εA = εB = 0.02, and Alice’s data are
the reference of reconciliation. The abscissa corresponds to
−10log10
(∫ η0
0
η2ApA(ηA)dηA
) (∫ η0
0
η2BpB(ηB)dηB
)
and rep-
resents the total mean fading losses in the two fading channels.
From Fig. 1(a) it is evident the protocol of homodyne
detection is able to generate much higher key rates than
the protocol of heterodyne detection. Even if the quadrature
variance of the TMSV state, v, in the protocol of homodyne
detection is chosen much lower, for example, when v = 5
the key rate resulting from the homodyne detection is still
significantly higher than the heterodyne detection2. Fig. 1(a)
has only been plotted for the case where Alice’s data are the
reference of reconciliation; however, in the symmetric setting,
2However, in a practical realization of the CV-MDI protocol where the PM
scheme is mostly utilized, the generation of squeezed states (equivalent to the
homodyne detection protocol) is more difficult relative to the generation of
coherent states (equivalent to the heterodyne detection protocol).
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Fig. 1. The key rate (in bits per pulse) resulting from the MDI protocol and
from the direct transmission scheme over (a) the fading channels and (b) the
fixed attenuation channels using the homodyne detections (solid lines) and
the heterodyne detections (dashed lines) in the symmetric setting.
where the two fading channels are characterized with the same
probability density distribution, the key rate is always the same
no matter whose data is the reference of reconciliation.
We also simulate the performance of the CV-MDI protocol
over the fixed-attenuation channels in relation to the fading
channels. In order to make a valid comparison, we assume
the loss in each fixed-attenuation channel is the same as
the mean fading loss in the corresponding fading channel,
i.e., τA =
∫ η0
0
η2ApA(ηA) dηA and τB =
∫ η0
0
η2BpB(ηB) dηB .
Fig. 1(b) shows the key rate (in bits per pulse) over the fixed-
attenuation channels as a function of total channel losses, i.e.,
−10log10(τAτB) with all the settings and parameters being
the same as the corresponding protocols in Fig. 1(a).
The main point we wish to draw from these results is while
the CV-MDI protocol is only feasible over low-loss fixed-
attenuation channels, the same protocol is able to achieve pos-
itive key rates over high-loss fading channels. This advantage
originates from the stochastic nature of a fading channel.
It is perhaps interesting to compare our CV-MDI protocol
with a scheme in which the satellite acts as a reflecting relay
(trustworthy relay). This scheme referred to as the direct trans-
mission scheme has been studied in our previous work [27] in
terms of Gaussian entanglement generation. In this scheme,
Alice initially possesses a TMSV state, where one mode is
held by Alice, and the other mode is transmitted towards Bob
via a reflecting satellite over two independent fading channels.
After the distribution of entanglement, Alice and Bob can
proceed with CV-QKD by applying homodyne (or heterodyne)
detections to their own modes. In the typical point-to-point
CV-QKD, the reverse reconciliation (RR) scenario always
leads to higher key rates than the direct reconciliation (DR)
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Fig. 2. The key rate (in bits per pulse) resulting from the MDI protocol
using the homodyne detections for an asymmetric setting consistent with the
satellite directly overhead Alice (with Alice-Bob and Alice-satellite distances
set at 1000km). Also shown is the impact of the reconciliation efficiency for
the same asymmetric settings (v = 60, and εA = εB = 0.02).
scenario [33]. Hence, we only consider the RR scenario where
Bob’s data is the reference of reconciliation. We again consider
the symmetric setting, i.e., σb A = σb B = σb, and the same
type of detection by the trusted parties.
Fig. 1(a) also shows the key rate of the direct transmission
scheme for two types of detection, homodyne detection and
heterodyne detection, as a function of the total mean fading
losses. Note that for these calculations the value of the quadra-
ture variance is v = 60, and the value of the excess noise (the
receiver noise at Bob’s station) is chosen the same as that in
the CV-MDI protocol. These results, as expected, illustrate that
the MDI protocol is not as effective as the direct transmission
scheme in terms of the quantum key rates. The difference in
the key rates shown between the direct transmission protocol
and the MDI protocol simply illustrates the cost in moving
from a trustworthy relay to an untrustworthy relay.
We have also simulated the performance of the MDI pro-
tocol in the more generic asymmetric settings anticipated for
satellite communications (i.e. one link has less fading loss
than the other). For such circumstances, in general we find
similar trends to those shown in Fig. 1(a), but with slightly
higher key rates when the trusted party having the lower loss
is chosen as the reference of reconciliation. An example of
such a calculation is shown in Fig. 2 for σb A = 0.54σb B .
Such a setting simulates the circumstance when the satellite is
directly overhead one of the ground stations. From Fig. 2 we
can see that the impact of the geometry is very small, with
the key rate improvement only at about 20% at low losses
and almost negligible at the higher losses of 25-30dB. Such a
conclusion on the relevance of the geometry is not significantly
changed unless the ratio σb A/σb B is set at very unrealistic
values.3 In Fig. 2 we also take the opportunity to study the
influence of the reconciliation efficiency ξ alluded to earlier.
Thus far we have assumed a perfect reconciliation, ξ = 1.
The lower curves of Fig. 2 show the anticipated key rates
for a realistic high (but achievable) value of ξ = 0.95, and
for comparison an inefficient value ξ = 0.8. These results
indicate the importance of efficient classical codes (such as
well-designed LDPC codes) in the reconciliation phase.
The results shown in Figs. 1-2 can be translated into rates
per second after multiplication by the anticipated pulse gen-
eration rate. Pulse rates of order 100MHz can be anticipated
by state-of-the-art systems. The average key rate, of course,
must be determined through a weighted integration over all
possible geometrical configurations. However, from the results
presented in Figs. 1-2 we already see that, dependent on the
scheme adopted and on the actual loss rates, quantum key
rates in the range of up to a few kbit/s can be anticipated for
space-based implementations of the MDI protocol.
At the cost of additional complexity at the satellite, other
variants of the MDI paradigm are possible. For example,
inclusions of non-Gaussian operations at the relay, such as
a single-photon subtraction from each incoming pulse, prior
to the Bell measurement could be invoked. Such photonic
subtraction would generate a conditional state between Alice
and Bob that would be non-Gaussian in nature, possibly
possessing enhanced entanglement - and therefore leading to
higher key rates. Our preliminary analysis of such a single-
photon subtraction scheme appears to indicate that higher key
rates will not be forthcoming - largely because of the low
probabilities associated with the photon subtraction procedure.
Nonetheless, future work in this area could explore this issue
in more detail, possibly extending the scope to include even
more exotic quantum operations at the relay. It is certainly not
impossible that the quantum key generation rates presented
here can be significantly improved upon if more sophisticated
quantum operations are possible on board the satellite.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this work we have explored a CV-based MDI protocol for
two terrestrial stations communicating via an untrustworthy
LEO satellite. In terms of the quantum key rates, we have
found that the probabilistic nature of the fading channels
towards the satellite can lead to significant and practical
advantages relative to fixed-attenuation channels. Specifically,
we found that the MDI protocol is feasible over high-loss
fading channels, while it is only able to generate non-zero
quantum key rates over low-loss fixed-attenuation channels.
The results given here represent a valuable quantitative as-
sessment of measurement-device-independence technology as
applied to future space-based quantum communications. They
3That is, unrealistic in the context of a satellite being the measurement
device between two ground stations. Of course low ratios of σb A/σb B
can be anticipated if one of the “ground” stations is replaced with a high-
flying aircraft or a space-based transmitter. In such cases, order of magnitude
improvements in the quantum key rates can be anticipated.
are particularly interesting given the outcome that ultra-secure
communications between two ground stations can be made
viable even when the relay satellite is held by an adversary.
The best an adversary can do in such circumstances is to report
false measurement outcomes - an act which provides her with
no insight to the actual key. Such false reporting is detectable
and can only reduce the final key rate generated by the two
ground stations.
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APPENDIX
An equivalence between the PM schemes and the EB
schemes has been used in this analysis. The path to showing
such equivalence has been previously detailed in [14] for the
case where the initial quantum resource is a coherent state.
Here we detail the similar path to equivalence when the initial
quantum state is a squeezed state.
To make progress we define a modified PM scheme in which
Alice (Bob), initially possesses the TMSV state ρ12 (ρ34), and
then makes a homodyne detection on mode 1 (mode 4). It is
straightforward to show that such a modified PM scheme is
equivalent to the PM scheme with a squeezed state as the initial
quantum resource, and we simply adopt such an equivalence
here. To show equivalence between the modified PM scheme
and the EB scheme, we demonstrate that the probabilities for
generic data outcomes for both schemes are identical.
In the modified PM scheme, the initial density matrix of
the system including Eve, ρE , can be written as ρ0 = ρ12 ⊗
ρE⊗ρ34. We assume Alice and Bob measure the qˆ quadrature
of modes 1 and 4, yielding q1 and q4 with the probability
p(q1, q4). After their measurement, the density operator of the
system is given by
ρ23E =
〈q1, q4| ρ0 |q1, q4〉
p (q1, q4)
. (9)
Modes 2 and 3 are then transmitted towards the untrusted relay,
in which the Bell measurement is applied to the incoming
modes, yielding qs and pt with the probability p(qs, pt). Here,
we assume any transformation on the transmitted modes 2 and
3 as well as Eve’s ancillas (before obtaining the outcomes qs
and pt) can be inserted into a global unitary operator U23E .
Thus, the probability pm of all the measurement outcomes
(q1, q4, qs, pt) is given by
pm (q1, q4, qs, pt) =
p (q1, q4) 〈qs, pt|U23E ρ23E U †23E |qs, pt〉 .(10)
Substituting ρ23E of Eq. (9) into Eq. (10), we will have
pm (q1, q4, qs, pt) =
〈q1, q4, qs, pt|U23E ρ0 U †23E |q1, q4, qs, pt〉 .(11)
The Bell measurement result (qs, pt) is then communicated to
Alice and Bob. According to the result (qs, pt), Bob modifies
his data q4 by Q4 = q4 + kqs, where k is the gain factor
in the modified PM scheme. However, Alice keeps her data
unchanged, i.e., Q1 = q1. Thus, the probability p of the final
data (Q1, Q4, qs, pt) is given by
p (Q1, Q4, qs, pt) = pm (Q1, Q4 − kqs, qs, pt) =
〈Q1, Q4 − kqs, qs, pt|U23Eρ0U †23E |Q1, Q4 − kqs, qs, pt〉 =
〈Q1, Q4, qs, pt|D (kqs)U23Eρ0U †23ED† (kqs) |Q1, Q4, qs, pt〉 ,(12)
where D (kqs) is the displacement operator. Note, if Bob
measures the pˆ quadrature of his mode 4, yielding p4, after
receiving the Bell measurement result, he modifies his data as
P4 = p4 − kpt.
Now, we consider the EB scheme, where Alice and Bob
generate the TMSV states ρ12 and ρ34 respectively, and
transmit modes 2 and 3 towards the untrusted relay. After the
Bell measurement at the relay with the outcome (qs, pt) and
the probability p(qs, pt), the density operator of the system is
given by
ρ14 =
〈qs, pt|U23E ρ0 U †23E |qs, pt〉
p (qs, pt)
, (13)
where the initial density matrix of the system, ρ0, and the
global unitary operator U23E are the same as those in the
modified PM scheme. After broadcasting the Bell measure-
ment results (qs, pt) to Alice and Bob, Alice keeps mode 1
unchanged, while Bob displaces mode 4 by the displacement
operator D (gqs), where g is the gain factor in the EB scheme.
At this step the density operator of the system is given by
ρ14′ =
〈qs, pt|D (gqs)U23E ρ0 U †23ED† (gqs) |qs, pt〉
p (qs, pt)
, (14)
where mode 4′ is mode 4 after the displacement. Then Alice
and Bob apply the homodyne detections on mode 1 and 4′,
respectively. Here, again we assume Alice and Bob measure
the qˆ quadrature of modes 1 and 4′, yielding Q1 and Q4. The
probability p of the data (Q1, Q4) given the Bell measurement
result (qs, pt) is
p (Q1, Q4 |qs, pt ) = 〈Q1, Q4| ρ14′ |Q1, Q4〉 . (15)
Thus, the probability of the final data (Q1, Q4, qs, pt) is given
by
p (Q1, Q4, qs, pt) = p (Q1, Q4 |qs, pt ) p (qs, pt) =
〈Q1, Q4, qs, pt|D (gqs)U23Eρ0U †23ED† (gqs) |Q1, Q4, qs, pt〉 .(16)
Comparing Eqs. (12) and (16), the probability of the final data
is the same for the modified PM scheme and the EB scheme
when k = g. As such, the modified PM scheme and our
EB scheme are equivalent. The equivalence between the PM
scheme and the modified PM scheme leads to the equivalence
claimed in this paper.
